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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this research is to examine empirically the impact of 
two types of fraudulent act on individual’s reporting intention under reward model. 
This research applied the Reinforcement theory in designing whistleblowing 
policies. In this context, reward system in encouraging disclosure of fraudulent act 
was used. This study was designed using experiment method 2x2 between subjects 
with 86 participants from private universities. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires 
that every public company must establish anonymous channel regarding disclosure 
of fraudulent act. However, under the reward system it may become different 
prediction that non-anonymous channel is preferable than the other one. Using 
two types of fraudulent act, this research investigated whether those types 
affected individual’s intention for disclosing fraud in choosing the reporting 
channel because a reward is provided or not. The result shows that the interaction 
between the type of fraudulent act and type of channel could encourage 
individual’s intention to blow the whistle. However, individual prefers to report the 
misappropriation of asset through anonymous channel than non-anonymous even 
though a reward is provided.  
 







The purpose of reporting fraud in the organization is to achieve economic 
goal as well as social goal. In order to achieve those goals, support from 
others is needed by whistleblower, even though fact shows that 
whistleblowers will get lots of harms. Elliston (1982) states that employee 
only has a little right and will be refused by other employees. Retaliation is 
one of the negative consequences for whistleblower. There are a lot of 
studies concerning retaliation on employee who blow the whistle, one of 
them is a study conducted by Liyanarachichi and Newdick (2009). Reporters 
of wrongdoing probably expect a strong procedural protection to hide 
identity (Kaplan, Peny, Samuels & Zang, 2009). 
 
Whistleblowing as an effective mechanism for disclosing corporate fraud is 
highlighted by the disclosure of the biggest reporting scandal that involves 
two corporations in United States: Enron and WorldCom (Bowen, Call & 
Rajagopal, 2010). In Indonesia, one of the whistleblowing cases has been 
conducted by the former head of Indonesian National Police's Criminal 
Investigation Agency who disclosed corruption scandal that happened in 
the police department (Lestari & Yaya, 2017). 
 
The importance of whistleblowing to disclose corporate malfeasance 
encourages regulator for creating effective ways to disclose wrongdoing in 
organization.  Section 301 & 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 are designed 
to encourage whistleblowing and provide safety from retaliation.  Section 
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go public  to  establish  anonymous  channel  for rejecting and detecting 
accounting fraud and weakness of control. The anonymous reporting 
channel is expected to reduce cost of reporting (Kaplan & Sclutz, 2007). This 
regulation is needed since the  facts  show  that  big  frauds  were disclosed  
by  employee  and  media  instead of  an auditor whose  responsibilities are 
to disclose frauds (Dyck, Morse & Zingales, 2007). Their study shows that 
media (academic publication) contribution is 23.5% and employee is 16.8%. 
 
The study that examines the effectiveness of anonymous reporting channel 
to encourage individual for disclosing fraud in structural system held by 
Kaplan, Peny, Samuels and Zang (2009). Their study indicates that individuals 
better to report a fraud that involves misappropriation of asset than fraud 
that involves financial reporting anonymously under weak and strong 
procedural safeguard. AICPA professional standards (AICPA 2008, AU 316) 
distinguish fraud into misappropriation of asset and fraudulent financial 
statement, Kaplan, Peny, Samuels and Zang (2009) use those fraudulent act 
type in their study. Ayers and Kaplan (2005) are consistently found the 
relation between the degrees of the seriousness of wrongdoing on the 
reporting intention.  
 
Ayers and Kaplan (2005) examine further  the seriousness  of  wrongdoing  
to  individual reporting intention through  anonymous  and  non-anonymous  
channels, the degree of the seriousness of wrongdoing is significantly related 
to reporting intention trough anonymous and non-anonymous channels.  On 
other hand, the studies (Kaplan, Peny, Samuels & Zang, 2009; Schlutz, 1993) 
only use anonymous channel for reporting fraud. It may be irrelevant when 
the organization only provides anonymous channel instead of non-
anonymous channel when there is financial reward provided for encouraging 
whistleblower (Seifert, Sweeny, Joiremen & Thornton, 2010).  
 
Reinforcement theory assumes that behavior is motivated by reward which 
has been given to such kind of behavior. Xu and Ziegenfuss (2008) state that 
reward system has an effect in encouraging individual to report wrongdoing.  
Their research tells that the intention of internal auditors in reporting 
wrongdoing to their superior is higher when they get incentives. Reward 
system1 that is implemented in organization, by providing financial rewards 
as well as long term employment contract, could abolish the negative impact 
of the retaliation on whistleblower. It means that reward system has a 
positive effect to disclose wrongdoing or fraud. Fraud in organization is 
divided into two types, misappropriation of asset and fraudulent financial 
statement. 
 
The types of fraud in organization will lead different respond from the 
organization member. The misappropriation of asset involves taking 
company assets such as cash and inventory to enrich the employee who take 
it. Since theft of asset is involved in misappropriation of assets, individuals 
perceive this type of fraudulent act is more serious than fraudulent financial 
                                                 
1 Reward system is mechanism which an organization will implement reward scheme for individual that act congruence with 
organization goal. 
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reporting. Kaplan, Peny, Samuels and Zang, (2009) indicate that individual’s 
intention to report fraud is stronger for misappropriation of assets act than 
for the fraudulent financial reporting. This different perception of fraud type 
has relation with the whistleblowing intention. Ayers and Kaplan (2005) 
found that seriousness of act and reporting intention has a relation.  
 
There are a lot of studies about whistleblowing factor is in the auditing area 
such as Coram, Ferguson and Moroney (2008); Mustafa and Youssef (2010), 
but only a few numbers came from management accounting context 
(Seifert, 2010). Whistleblowing can be divided in two areas of study, the 
auditing and management accounting area. In Audit context, auditor’s role is 
detecting and disclosing financial reporting irregularities. In management 
accountant context, management accounting must have ability to observe, 
participate in, or have knowledge of financial statement fraud (Seifert, 
Sweeny, Joiremen & Thornton, 2010).  
 
Chiasson, Johnson and Byington (1995) state that Management accountants 
have some obligations to organization where they work in, their profession 
as well as society (public) and their selves. Management accountants also 
have responsibility in keeping confidential information, disclosing all relevant 
information and communicating unfavorable information.  Therefore, when 
management accountants are faced with wrongdoing, they have a 
responsibility to communicate this information. The responsibility of 
management accountant to communicate  unfavorable  information  can  be 
interpreted  as  a  responsibility  to  act  as whistleblowing. Therefore, the 
current study’s purpose is to prove whether the type of fraudulent act have 
an effect on encouraging employee to disclose company fraud through 








Whistleblowing is defined by Near and Miceli (1985) as follows: 
 
“The disclosure about illegal,  immoral  or  illegitimate practices  under  the  
control  of  their  employers by  organization  members  (former or  current) 
to  persons  or  organizations  that  may  be  able  to effect  action.”  
 
Seifert (2006) explains the definition above by describing that an illegal act is 
any criminal act which can get punishment from the law, an immoral act is a 
wrong act and an illegitimate practice as an action that is justified by the 
whistleblower to be beyond the organization’s authority. 
 
Whistleblowing will be successful if supported by communicating tools that 
include audience, purpose, language and tone of wrongdoing. According to 
Near and Miceli (1985), individual can do whistleblowing internally and 
externally. One of the advantages of internal whistleblowing is organization’s 
issue may still be solved internally before exposed to outside organization or 
public. Gao (2015) states that lower level employee will report fraud to 
external channel if it is available to avoid retaliation.  
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Whistleblower needs support from surroundings people because 
whistleblowing is intended to achieve specific goals, economic and social. 
However, the facts show that whistleblower will get intimidation like 
retaliation (Liyanarachichi & Newdick, 2009; Robinson, Robertson & Curtis 
2012; Dyck, Morse & Zingales, 2010; Kaplan, Peny, Samuels & Zang, 2009).  
 
Non-anonymous and Anonymous Hotline 
 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 asks audit committee of go public organization to 
provide reporting channel anonymously to refuse and detect fraud in 
accounting and control weakness. Sarbanes-Oxley requires anonymous 
reporting channel that can encourage employee to report information 
without feeling terrified. Anonymous reporting channel makes individual feel 
comfortable and safe since his/her identity is covered. The requirement of 
anonymous reporting channel for reporting unclear accounting problem is 
consistent with the findings of previous studies conducted by Schultz, 
Johnson, Morries and Dyrnes (1993) and Schultz and Hook (1998). Kaplan, 
Peny, Samuels and Zang (2009) states that there are two things that affect 
the effectiveness of anonymous reporting channel; extend of the employees 
in discovering fraud or symptom of fraud and the willingness of the 
employee in reporting their discovery to an appropriate person. They state 
that anonymous reporting channel become the most effective channel for 
detecting fraud act earlier than others and potentially preventing and 
restricting such act to occur in the future.  
 
Nevertheless, other studies show different evidence. Previous researches 
state that it is better for reporter  to use anonymous reporting channel than 
non-anonymous reporting channels (Near & Miceli, 1995). There are two 
reasons that explain the condition. First, they are avoiding retaliation. This 
suggests that the report under an anonymous reporting channel will result 
lower personal costs because the organization cannot trace the individual’s 
identity who report misconduct. Second, since the organization is difficult in 
assessing the credibility of the reporter, the information provided through 
this channel will be taken less seriously. Individuals may think to avoid 
anonymous reporting channel if they believe that the response to the 
wrongdoing is not effective or serious, it means that non-anonymous 
channel is perceived to be more effective because the reporter can be 
contacted by the organization for further investigation. Previous discussion 
shows that individuals still need further consideration to decide whether 
they prefer to use anonymous or non-anonymous channel in reporting any 
wrongdoings.  
 
The previous discussion shows that anonymous reporting channel is not the 
only effective channel to report fraud in comparison to non-anonymous. 
Individuals still consider the corporate’s response about the disclosure of 





Reinforcement theory assumes that individual’s behavior is motivated by 
reward which ever given by organization to that behavior.  Klingle (1996) 
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states that reinforcement theory is based on central premise, getting reward 
stimuli and eliminating aversive one may drive individual’s behavior. 
Motivation and intensive are two of seven components which are used to 
formulate management control system. Five other components are 
corporate governance, responsibility accounting, performance measure-
ments and directions. The biggest challenge for organization is how to 
motivate employee to do the best for achieving organization’s goal (Hoque, 
2003). The evidence shows that internal auditors is willing to report 
wrongdoing to the highest authority if reward is provided (Xu & Ziegenfuss, 
2008). Putri (2012) states individual will disclose fraud through non-
anonymous hotline if reward is provided.   
 
Near and Miceli (1985) state that when wrongdoing is consistently followed 
by positive management reaction, it will be stimuli for behavior. Reward 
system which provides monetary payment will effectively encourage 
whistleblowing and evidence shows that incentive is effective for disclosing 
wrongdoing (Dworkin, 2007; Dyck, Morse & Zingales, 2007). It indicates that 
reward system will revise wrongdoing and fraud detection. Ponemon (1994) 
brings the issue about significant of monetary reward or long-term contract 
as incentive to report organizational fraud or wrongdoing to abolish negative 
consequence from retaliation on whistleblower. Therefore, whistleblowers 
are not scare to show their identity if reward is provided. 
 
Reward system changes paradigm that anonymous channel in structural 
system is the most effective way to encourage individual for whistleblowing. 
According to previous studies that discussed above, it can be predicted that 
non-anonymous reporting channel still effective to report wrongdoing under 
reward system. 
 
Reporting Channel, Reward System and Fraudulent Act Type 
 
Ayers and Kaplan (2005) give evidence that based on the consideration of 
cost and benefit that may occur, individual prefer to use anonymous 
reporting channel. Lower cost is occurred when reporter use anonymous 
channel. Meanwhile non-anonymous reporting channel is used because this 
channel has more effective response to the fraudulent act. Since there is 
higher probability that recipient will assess the validity of information 
reporter. Another study (Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008) examine about reward 
systems that may have effects on auditors’ disclosing wrongdoing. 
Organization that establish reward system usually use cash, bonus, or 
employee contract as incentive for encouraging disclosing. The results 
indicate that the individual’s intention to report wrongdoing in organization 
to higher authority is higher when cash incentive or guaranteed employee 
contract are provided. This reward system has strong influence on the 
likelihood of whistleblowing behavior. It means that there is no fear to show 
their identity or report using non-anonymous channel when reward is 
provided.  
 
The study conducted by Xu and Ziegenfuss (2008) proves that in the 
condition when reward is provided for whistleblower, internal auditors have 
higher likelihood in reporting wrongdoing, compared to when it is without 
reward provided. These results however, only applicable under specific 
whistleblowing mechanism. By reducing and eliminating the retaliation, 
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anonymous channel that is provided in internal organization, become a 
positive structural mechanism for encouraging whistleblowing (Kaplan, Peny, 
Samuels & Zang, (2009). On other hand, it may be irrelevant when financial 
reward is provided for motivating individual to report the wrongdoing. Based 
on the discussion above, hypothesis 1 is formulated below: 
 
H1: It is more likely that individual will report through non-anonymous 
channel than anonymous channel when reward is provided. 
 
 
Auditing literatures divide fraud into two types: misappropriation of asset 
and fraudulent financial reporting. These two types of fraud have different 
extend of fraud. The first type involves taking company assets such as cash 
and inventory to enrich the employee who take it. Therefore, this type 
involves taking company’s real resources illegally. On other hand, the second 
type of fraud is referring such kind of “cooking the book”, by overstating 
income through misreporting financial results and financial position (Kaplan, 
Peny, Samuel & Zang 2009). In the fraudulent financial reporting context 
there is no direct resources or wealth transfer to individual who do that. 
Even though engaging in the fraud may give indirect benefit through reward 
such as compensation, bonuses, promotion and so on. The most frequent 
act involved in fraudulent financial reporting is overstating revenues or 
understating expenses; since they think that it will correct naturally by the 
time (Wells, 2008). 
 
Since theft of asset is involved in misappropriation of assets, individuals 
perceive this type of fraudulent act is more serious than fraudulent financial 
reporting. Kaplan, Peny, Samuels and Zang, (2009) indicate that individual’s 
intention to report fraud is stronger for misappropriation of assets act 
compared to the fraudulent financial reporting. Ayers and Kaplan (2005) and 
Schultz, Johnson, Morris and Dyrnes (1993) found that seriousness of act 
and reporting intention has a relation.  However, seriousness of wrongdoing 
influences individual intention to choose type of channel. Based on the 
above discussion, current research expect that individuals will likely report 
misappropriation of asset and fraudulent financial reporting without feeling 
scared if their identity is known by others because reward is provided. 
Hypothesis below summarizes these expectations: 
 
H2: It is more likely that individual will report misappropriation of assets than 
fraudulent financial statement. 
 
H3: It is more likely that individual will report misappropriation of asset 
through anonymous channel and report fraudulent financial reporting 





Experiment Design  
 
This study used experiment 2x2 between subjects. This research used 
laboratory experiment because this method provides high validity in 
explaining the relation between independent and dependent variables. The 
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experiment used two treatments, two types of fraudulent act, 
misappropriation of assets and fraudulent financial reporting under reward 
system, by anonymous and non-anonymous channels. Experiment design is 
in Table 1. This experiment used experiment method since the internal 
validity level was higher in this method. Between subject method was used 
to avoid carryover effect because in the between subjects design participant 




Participants in this study were undergraduate students in management 
accounting class. This study used undergraduate students because they are 
free from disturbing variable that will not be tested in this research, such us 
retaliation and experiences. They come from private university in 
Yogyakarta. The consideration is that they should have taken management 
accounting class since they should have comprehension in participating, 
observing or having knowledge about fraud in financial statement and in the 
ethical conflict situation (Seifert, Sweeny, Joiremen & Thornton, 2010).  In 
this experiment participant became an assistant purchasing manager in 
organization for misappropriation asset of fraudulent act type and became 
divisional financial accountant for fraudulent financial reporting.  
 
Pilot test used 40 graduate students in private university in Yogyakarta. 
Theree were many inputs received from pilot test. This experiment was 
divided into 4 batches. Participants in the first batch were 23 students, the 
second batch were 36 students, the third batch were 39 students and the 
last batch were 40 students. The experiment was suited with management 
accounting class.  
 
Dependent Variable Measurement 
 
Whistleblowing Intention  
 
In this study, whistleblowing refers to individual’s intention as employee of 
organization to report individual and corporate wrongdoing to internal 
organization resources. Individual’s intention to report wrongdoing is 
dependent variable. Dependent variable in this experiment is measured 
using self-assessment. Participants were asked to measure their intention to 
report fraud in 7-point Likert scale at 1 (extremely unlikely) and at 7 
(extremely likely). The instrument used is this experiment is adopted from 
Ayers and Kaplan (2005). 
 
 
        Table 1 Experiment Group Design 
  Channel 
  Anonymous Non-anonymous 
Type of fraudulent act Misappropriation of assets Group 1 Group 2 
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Independent Variable Measurement 
 
Anonymous and Non-anonymous  
 
Anonymous reporting channel is a reporting channel in which the identity of 
the reporter will be kept. Meanwhile the non-anonymous reporting channel 
is the channel when the identity of the reporter is known. The reporting 
channels are manipulated between participants. Using statement adopted 
from Ayers and Kaplan (2005), anonymous (ANONYM) and non-anonymous 
(NON-ANONYM) channels were manipulated.  
 
Reward System  
 
Reward system (RWDM) is a mechanism in which an organization will 
implement reward scheme for individual that act congruence with 
organization goal. This system is manipulated with statement related 
organization policy to encourage employee for reporting or not reporting. 
Statement manipulation for structural system adopted from (Seifert, 
Sweeny, Joiremen & Thornton, 2010) while reward system is adopted from 
Xu and Zeigenfuss (2008). 
 
Type of Fraudulent Act 
 
There are two types (TYPE) of fraudulent act variable used in this research; 
misappropriation of asset (ASSET) and fraudulent financial reporting (FR), 
which are adopted from Kaplan, Peny, Samuels and Zang (2009). The case 
for misappropriation of assets involve a false billing scheme by creating a 
shell company2. Since a false billing scheme represents one of the most 
frequent schemes to misappropriation asset so it was selected for this 
research and it often involves substantial amounts of cash (ACFE, 2008). The 
fraudulent financial reporting case involves improper valuation of asset, a 
frequent method of fraudulent financial reporting (ACFE, 2008). 
 
Procedure and Task of Participants  
 
Whistleblowing intention, reporting channel and type of fraudulent act were 
measured using previous instrument which is used by many studies such as 
Kaplan, Peny, Samuels and Zang, (2009) and Ayers and Kaplan, (2005). While 
reward system was manipulated using the study instrument of Xu and 
Ziegenfuss (2008).  
 
Experiment process was started from reading experiment instruction related 
to requirement of experiment process. First step, participants were divided 
into groups, each group was supervised by one experiment instructor. The 
groups were made so that when distributing the experiment case is easier 
and preventing the participants from working together. Second step, 
instructors distributed experiment case to participant in each group. After all 
participants received experiment case, the third step was they did the case 
and answered the question. 
                                                 
2 A shell company is entity that has no active business and usually exists only in name as a vehicle or another company’s business 
operations. 
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In this experiment, participants were given an experimental instrument 
describing ABC Inc., a food and beverage manufacturer. The background 
information about the company shows that there is an indication that the 
performance is slightly below the industry average. In this experiment 
participant became an assistant purchasing manager in organization for 
misappropriation asset of fraudulent act type and became divisional financial 
accountant for fraudulent financial reporting.  
 
Treatment in group 1: The case stated that there was a billing for the 
company about service that never received by a fictitious firm (shall 
company). In this case, the assistant purchasing manager discovered the 
scheme when he realized that the vendor’s post office box address was 
identical to that purchasing manager. The assistant purchasing manager 
determined that approximately $800,000 in expenditure for services was not 
received but paid to the shell company had occurred, reducing earning per 
share by $0,02 per share, which exactly met the financial analyst’s 
expectation.  
 
The corporate had a policy to encourage their employees to report by 
providing substantial amount cash reward. The corporate provided reporting 
channel anonymously by telephone channel to inform the company of any 
wrong doing.  The reporter’s identity would not be asked by the receiver.  As 
assistant of purchasing manager, who likely the respondents would report 
this case using anonymous channel. 
 
Treatment in group 2: The case stated that there was a billing for the 
company about service that never received by a fictitious firm (shall 
company). In this case, the assistant purchasing manager discovered the 
scheme when he realized that the vendor’s post office box address was 
identical to that purchasing manager. The assistant purchasing manager 
determined that approximately $800,000 in expenditure for services not 
received but paid to the shell company had occurred, reducing earning per 
share by $0.02 per share, which exactly met the financial analyst’s 
expectation. 
 
The corporate had a policy to encourage their employees to report by 
providing substantial amount cash reward. Employee could report any 
wrong doing to corporate non-anonymously by informing top manager or 
the ethics committee.  As assistant of purchasing manager, who likely the 
respondents would report this case directly to the top manager and the 
ethics committee.  
 
Treatment in group 3: The case for the fraudulent financial reporting context 
involved improper asset valuation. In this case, a divisional financial 
accountant discovered that $800,000 of expenses had been capitalized by 
his supervisor. The supervisor was the controller of the division. The 
misrecording increased earnings per share by $0.02, which exactly met the 
financial analyst’s expectation.  
 
The corporate had a policy to encourage their employee to report by 
providing substantial amount cash reward. The corporate provided reporting 
channel anonymously by telephone channel to inform the company of any 
wrong doing.  The reporter’s identity would not be asked by the receiver.  As 
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assistant of purchasing manager, who likely the respondents would report 
this case using anonymous channel. 
 
Treatment in group 4: The case for the fraudulent financial reporting context 
involved improper asset valuation. In this case, a divisional financial 
accountant discovered that $800,000 of expenses had been capitalized by 
his supervisor, the controller of the division. The misrecording increased 
earnings per share by $0.02, which exactly met the financial analyst’s 
expectation. The corporate had a policy to encourage their employees to 
report by providing substantial amount cash reward. Employee could report 
any wrong doing to corporate non-anonymously by informing the top 
manager or the ethics committee.  As assistant of purchasing manager, who 
likely the respondents would report this case directly to the top manager 
and the ethics committee. Fourth step, participants were asked in 
manipulation checks. The manipulation questions were: (1) do you think that 
this is serious fraudulent act? (2) Is the whistleblower’s identity will be kept 
confidential?  (3) Who will know the whistleblower’s identity? (4) What 
would he get if whistleblower reports the wrongdoing? These questions are 




Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to test the hypothesis. ANOVA is 
data calculation procedure for testing mean difference of more than two 
groups (Robert Ho, 2013). In this research ANOVA was used to compare 
individual intention for reporting two types of wrongdoing under reward 
system by anonymous and non-anonymous channels.  
 
 




Eighty-six participants from one hundred thirty-eight participants were 
success in manipulation check. They were forty-three males and forty-three 
females. To know whether there was an effect of demographic variable to 
dependent variable, then first, this study tested demographic variable. 
Demographic data that were collected from participant were only sex or 
gender. The result indicated that there was no effect between demographic 




First of all, this study examined batch (BATCH) to whistleblowing intention. 
This test is to indicate if there is difference in dependent variable score 
between two universities and five experiment batches. The result from the 
test of control variable is insignificant. It means that BATCH variable does not 
affect INT (See panel A in Table 3). 
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    Table 2 The Result of ANOVA Test 
              Panel: Test Between Subject Effect   
 Dependent Variable:  whistleblowing Intention 
Source  SS df F Sig 
Control Variables: Sex  0,432 1,00 0,789 0,377 
 
 
The Result and Interpretation of Main Effect 
 
The main effect of type of fraudulent act (TYPE) to whistleblowing intention 
(INT) is insignificant, with F-value= 0,058 and probability 0.811, this value is 
above 0.05 (Panel A; Table 3). Meanwhile, the mean of fraudulent financial 
reporting (FR) is 6.129 and misappropriation asset (ASSET) is 6.158. The 
mean value of two variables is not significant with the significant value is 
0.811. It means that whistleblowing intention is not only be influenced by 
the type of fraudulent act.  
 
Main effect of channel variable (CHANNEL) to whistleblowing intention (INT) 
is not significant, with F-value= 1.175 and probability is 0.281, this value is 
above the significant level 0.05 (Panel A; table 3). Meanwhile, the mean in 
anonymous channel is 6.078 and non-anonymous channel is 6.208. The 
mean value for two variables is not significant with significant level is 0.281. 
It means that whistleblowing intention is not only influenced by the channel. 
 
The Result of Interaction Test 
 
In this sub chapter, the result of interaction effect between variables is 
presented in experiment design 2x2 between subjects (Table 1). Analysis 
result of the interaction between variables can be seen in panel B and C 
Table 3. Post Hoc test result is summarized in Table 3. The result of Post Hoc 
test shows that mean difference between group 1 (SYSTM= RWRD, TYPE= 
ASSET, CHANNEL= ANONYM) and group 2 (SYSTM= RWRD, TYPE= ASSET, 
CHANNEL= NON-ANONYM) is significant. With mean difference of 0,815. It 
means that there is difference in individual intention to report through 
anonymous reporting channel than non-anonymous channel.  
 
The mean difference between group 3 (SYSTM= RWDM, TYPE= FR, 
CHANNEL= ANONYM) and group 4 (SYSTM= RWDM, TYPE= FR, 
CHANNEL= NON-ANONYM) is significant, with mean difference of -
1,076. It means that there is a difference in individual intention to 
report through anonymous reporting channels compared to non-
anonymous reporting channel. Hypothesis 1 predicts that non-
anonymous channel is chosen by individual in reporting wrongdoing 
when reward is provided, however, the result shows that it happens 
only on a special case, that is fraudulent financial statement. On other 
hand, individual reports misappropriation of asset through anony-
mous channel.  
 
However, if the means of group 1 and 3 (anonymous channel) are 
added, the result is 12.156. Instead, the total mean of group 2 and 4 
(non-anonymous channel) is 12.427. The difference of total mean bet- 
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  Table 3 The Result of ANOVA Test Means (SD) and  The Comparison Between Cells 
  Panel A: Test Between Subject Effect   
Dependent Var: Whistleblowing Intention 
Sources SS df F Sig. 
Control Variables     
   Batch 1,507 3 0,917 0,437 
   Sex 0,432 1 0,789 0,377 
Main Effect     
   Type 0,018 1 0,058 0,811 
   Channel 0,364 1 1,175 0,281 
Interaction effect     
   Type*Channel 19,168 1 61,912 0,00 
Error 25,387 82   
Correlated Total 45,035 85   
R Squared= 0,436 (Adjusted R squared= 0,416) 
Panel B: Means (SD) and Participants in Each Cell 
Comparison Mean diff (J-I) Channel 
  Anonymous Non-anonymous 
Type Misappropriatio

















Panel C: Comparison 
  Comparison Mean diff (J-I) ES Sig. 
Group 1 - Group 2 0,815 0,170 0,000** 
Group 3 - Group 4 -1,076 0,170 0,000** 
Group 1 - Group 3 







Group 1 - Group 4 -0,101 0,168 0,930 
 
 
ween anonymous channel and non-anonymous channel is not significant.  It 
can be concluded that hypothesis 1 is rejected.  
 
The mean difference between group 1 (SYSTM= RWRD, TYPE= ASSET, 
CHANNEL= ANONYM) and group 3 (SYSTM= RWRD, TYPE= FR, CHANNEL= 
ANONYM) is significant, with the mean difference of 0.9743. It means that 
there is difference in individual intention to report fraud under reward 
system between misappropriation of asset and fraudulent financial reporting 
through anonymous channel. The individual intention to disclose 
misappropriation of asset is stronger compared to report fraudulent 
financial reporting under anonymous channel.  
 
The mean difference between group 2 (SYSTM= RWRD, TYPE= ASSET, 
CHANNEL= NON-ANONYM) and group 4 (SYSTM= RWRD, TYPE= FR, 
CHANNEL= NON-ANONYM) is significant, with the mean difference of -
0.9167. It means that there is a difference in individual intention to report 
fraud under reward system between misappropriation of asset and 
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fraudulent financial reporting through non-anonymous channel. As a result, 
between group 2 and 4, the individual intention to disclose fraudulent of 
financial reporting is stronger compared to the report misappropriation of 
asset under non-anonymous channel. However, if the mean of group 1 and 2 
(misappropriation of asset) is 12.315 and total mean of group 3 and 4 
(fraudulent financial statement) is 12.258, then it is not significant. The 
hypothesis 2 states that it is more likely that individual will report 
misappropriation of asset that financial statement. Therefore, it could be 
concluded that hypothesis 2 is partially supported.  
 
The comparison of group 1-2 and group 3-4 on the explanation above is also  
used to answer hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 states that it is more likely that 
individual will report the misappropriation of asset through anonymous 
channel and report fraudulent financial reporting through non-anonymous 
channel. Hypothesis 3 is accepted. However, additional analysis by 
comparing the mean difference between group 1 (SYSTM= RWRD, TYPE= 
ASSET, CHANNEL= ANONYM) and group 4 (SYSTM= RWDM, TYPE: FR, 
CHANNEL= NON-ANONYM) is not significant. It means that both channels 
are effective to report each type of fraud, the anonymous channel for 
misappropriation of asset and non-anonymous channel for fraudulent 
financial statement. In this research, the mean value of control group is 2.00 
with the significant value of 0.000. It means that without reward system and 
reporting channel, individual does not report fraudulent act. 
 
This study examines the type of fraudulent act and reporting channel for 
encouraging individual’s intention to blow the whistle under reward model. 
The result shows that individual still considers the channel, the anonymous 
or non-anonymous, in reporting type of fraudulent act. Individual reports the 
misappropriation of asset through anonymous channel and the fraudulent 
financial report through non-anonymous channel even though the reward is 
provided. It means that degree of seriousness of act does not influence the 
intention to report. The type of channel still becomes a consideration for 
blow the whistle.  
 
The combination between the type of act and type of channel is the best 
way to encourage individual disclose fraudulent act. The result does not 
confirm Xu and Zeigenfuss (2008). They said that internal auditor will report 
to higher authority if reward is provided. The difference may be influenced 
by the background of the participant of the experiment in which this 
research used undergraduate students that have never work as 
professionals while Xu and Zeigenfuss (2008) used regional internal auditor. 
As a result, incentive or reward will influence the auditor in disclosing wrong 
doing or fraud.  
 
This unexpected result in hypothesis 1 might be influenced by the 
seriousness of fraudulent act. Since misappropriation of assets involves the 
illegal act by taking or theft of assets, individuals perceive this type of 
fraudulent act is more serious than fraudulent financial reporting. Kaplan, 
Peny, Samuels and Zang (2009) indicate that individual’s intention to report 
misappropriation of assets act is higher compared to the report fraudulent 
financial reporting. This result has proven a relation between the degree of 
act seriousness and reporting intention and it is consistent with studies of 
Ayers and Kaplan, (2005) and King (1999). Individual feels scared if their 
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identity is known by others when reporting serious fraudulent act. On other 
hand, this study confirms previous researches in reward system (Xu & 
Zeigenfuss, 2008; Ponemon, 1994). Individual prefers to use the non-
anonymous channel for reporting fraudulent financial reporting when 
reward is provided. In this case, individual still thinks about retaliation in 
reporting serious fraudulent act even though reward is provided.  
 
The interesting evidence in this research is that under reward system 
individual prefers to use the anonymous channel to report more serious 
fraudulent act (misappropriation of asset) and prefers to use non-
anonymous channel to report less serious fraudulent act (fraudulent 
financial reporting). The result indicates that reward system is not the only 
reason for individual for disclosing wrongdoing. Individual still considers the 
cost of reporting such as retaliation compared to benefit that may get. The 
type of fraudulent act still influences the individual’s consideration in 





The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of two types of 
fraudulent act on individual’s reporting intention under reward model. The 
result shows that individual intention to disclose misappropriation of asset is 
higher than fraudulent financial statement. However, the result shows that 
even though reward is provided, individual will report misappropriation of 
asset through anonymous channel and fraudulent financial statement 
through non-anonymous channel.  
 
The implication of this study is for top management in an organization when 
they decide policy for encouraging their employees to disclose fraudulent 
act. The reward system in the organization is less effective in encouraging 
individual to report misappropriation of asset. Individual feels that they 
prefer disclose serious fraudulent act without getting reward. They feel 
scared about retaliation for reporting serious fraudulent act when their 
identities are known. On other hand, economic incentive can motivate 
individual to disclose less serious (such as; fraudulent financial reporting).  
 
This research has two limitations. First, participants in this research are 
undergraduate students in management accounting class. Their responses 
on whistleblowing intention probably become different from professionals 
that may have experiences in the real organization. Second, the cases in that 
experiment are not real situation, therefore emotions such as anger and fear 
that may exist in a real situation are absent as consequences of not involving 
the professionals as the participants. 
 
This study is a complementary research for survey research in wrongdoing 
disclosure. Experiment study has high validity and could explain the cause 
and effect relationship between variables strongly. Therefore, future 
research can extent this study in survey research. Another future research 
should test the effect of type of reward system, such as financial incentive or 
long-term employment contract and so on.  
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